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Consider the following case: two women (A and B) have entered into a registered partnership or marriage. After careful consideration they decide to start a family. For this purpose they need a man’s sperm. They are looking for a known donor who wants to be involved in the child’s life to a certain extent. In the end the women respond to an advertisement in a magazine in which a man (C) offers to help a female couple to realise their joint desire for a child. The man indicates that he wants to be involved in the child’s upbringing although remaining in the background. The three parties agree that “the man is the father of the child/children and will be known as such to third parties (family, friends)”.​[1]​ Furthermore, it is the intention of all the parties  - with the exception of the child, who does not yet have a say – that the mother (A) and her female partner (B) will bear the main responsibility for the child’s upbringing. What are the options for the parties involved in order to achieve this under Dutch law?
The only person certain of her legal link with the child is the woman who gave birth to the child (A). Under Dutch law she is the mother and therefore a legal parent (Dutch Civil Code 1:198)​[2]​. There are a number of ways, apart from adoption, in which a man, not necessarily the biological father, can become the second legal parent of the child. A man becomes a legal parent by operation of law if he is married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth. Furthermore, if the mother is single or in a registered partnership, a man can become a legal parent if he recognizes the child with the mother’s consent, before or after birth (Dutch Civil Code 1:199). If the man is the biological father, he may even recognize the child without the mother’s consent, if the court gives him leave to do so (provided that no other man has yet become a second legal parent to the child) (Dutch Civil Code 1:204 (3)). In case the biological father is unwilling to recognize the child, the mother or the child may petition the court to determine that the biological father is the legal father; this also applies to the male partner in life of the mother who has consented to an act that may have resulted in the conception of the child (Dutch Civil Code 1:207). All these options apply to men only under Dutch law, the female partner of the legal mother can only become a legal parent to the child they raise together through adoption. Under contemporary Dutch law such a so-called step-parent adoption is regarded as a form of single parent adoption; the legal relationship between the (remaining) legal parent and the child remains unchanged.​[3]​
The status of legal parent under Dutch law confers a number of rights and duties on a person, including a maintenance obligation until the child is 18 or 21, inheritance rights for the child (obligatory share), access rights, a veto right in the adoption proceedings of the child and, depending on the circumstances, parental authority. The legal mother has parental authority over her child from the moment of birth, for the father this is only the case if he is married to or in a partnership with the mother, or if he has recognized the child before birth. Under Dutch law parental authority gives one the right and the duty to care for and raise the child; this includes the care and responsibility for the mental and physical well being of the child and the stimulation of the development of its personality (Dutch Civil Code1:247 (1) (2)). A person who is not a legal parent of the child, can only acquire parental authority together with a person who is a legal parent of the child. The content of the shared parental authority of a legal parent and a person other than a legal parent is the same as the shared parental authority of two legal parents, unless it is determined otherwise by law (Dutch Civil Code 1:246 (5)). Under Dutch law only two persons can have parental authority over the child at the same time.
Since 1 January 2002 registered partners and married couples of the same sex have shared parental authority over the children born during their partnership/marriage by operation of law, unless the children already have a legal relationship with another parent outside the partnership/marriage (Dutch Civil Code 1:253sa).  If the female couple in the case under discussion want something more than shared parental authority, the partner (B) of the legal mother (A) can adopt the child, provided that the court concludes that the child has nothing more to expect from its parent(s) in the capacity of a parent now or in the future. 
C, on the other hand, who is not in a relationship (marriage, registration or otherwise) with the legal mother (A) and has not begotten the child with her in a natural way, has no rights and duties with regard to the child and vice versa, unless the mother consents to his recognition of the child. The only exception to this rule can be found in the Explanatory Memorandum​[4]​ to the Adoption by Same-Sex Couples Act, which defines the term parent in section 1:227(3) (second part of the sentence) as including a donor with ‘family life’ in the sense of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
From this brief introduction it becomes clear that the Dutch legislator has become aware of the fact that it is necessary to give children born into or brought up in non-marital relationships the legal protection they deserve. However, the question is whether the present jumble of regulations concerning this kind of parent-child relationship can in fact offer this protection. In order to answer this question I will first consider the new requirement introduced in the Dutch Civil Code with the implementation of the Adoption by Same-Sex Couples Act. Then I will discuss a recent judgement of the Dutch Supreme Court regarding a known donor’s request for the court to authorize him to recognize ‘his’ child. Subsequently, I will consider the legal position of the child, the biological father and the lesbian mothers.


2. Adoption by same-sex couples

Since 1998 same-sex couples can give shape to their parenthood by submitting a joint application to the court to invest the parent and the partner who is not a parent with shared parental authority (Dutch Civil Code 1:253t). Some time before the introduction of this regulation the question had already been raised whether same-sex couples should have the opportunity to adopt each other’s children. This question was answered in the affirmative. On 1 April 2001, the same day on which marriage was opened to same-sex couples,​[5]​ it became possible for gay and lesbian couples to adopt each other’s children and Dutch children who are unrelated to either of the prospective adoptive parents.​[6]​ However, this was not the only change made to the adoption law on that date. Section 1:227(3) stipulates that, apart from the requirement that the adoption is in the child’s best interest, the adoption request can only be granted if “it has been established and can be reasonably foreseen that the child has nothing more to expect from his parent or parents in their capacity of parent.” That this requirement gives rise to many questions already became clear during the parliamentary debates on the Bill. In the Memorandum pursuant to the Report, the State Secretary explained it as follows: “This new criterion concerns the parenthood of these parents. It is necessary to answer the question whether it may be expected that the parents (are able to and will) give shape to their parenthood in the future. Can it be assumed that the parents (in the long term) (are able to and will) give shape to the rights and duties ensuing from parenthood, such as caring for and raising the child, giving attention and providing material care?”​[7]​

Who is/are ‘a parent or parents’ according to the new requirement?
In the light of the subsidiarity principle articulated in section 4 of The Hague Adoption Convention of 1993​[8]​ and section 7 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child​[9]​ the court must check whether the child still has a relationship of any substance with the parent from whom the legal ties will be severed through the adoption. Adoption is after all a protection order with very far-reaching consequences, which has a significant and irreversible impact on the lives of the child and the parent(s) concerned. That the term parent(s) in section 1:227(3) 3 includes those persons who are designated as legal parents by the law pursuant to sections 1:198, 1:199 and 1:200 (3) is therefore self-evident. Section 1:198 stipulates that the woman who gives birth to or adopts a child is its legal mother. The (possible) legal father is defined in Section 1:199 as the man who is either married to the legal mother at the time of the birth, has recognized the child, whose paternity has been established by a judicial decision or who has adopted the child. Furthermore, section 1:200 (3) stipulates that the man who has consented to an act that may have resulted in the conception of the child by his spouse cannot deny his paternity. There are no other ways in which one can acquire the status of a legal parent under Dutch law.
 However, according to the Explanatory Memorandum, these are not the only people covered by the term parent(s) in this new requirement: “The words ‘parent or parents’ refer to legal as well as biological parents. That this term does not only include legal parents but under certain circumstances also biological parents, follows from jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Right. In view of Keegan​[10]​ the biological father of a child, who has not recognized the child concerned, but who may be deemed to have ‘family life’ with the child as of the moment of birth on the basis of his relationship with the mother, or on the basis of additional circumstances, can under certain circumstances be regarded as an interested party in his child’s adoption proceedings.”​[11]​ 
Keegan v. Ireland​[12]​ concerned an unmarried couple who had been living together for some time. During their cohabitation the partners decided to have a child, shortly after which the woman became pregnant. Some time later the relationship broke down. After the birth the woman gave up the child for adoption without informing the father of this decision. Only after the child had been placed in a foster family did she inform the father. As the unmarried natural father of the child, he had no rights under Irish law to become involved in the adoption proceedings. If he wanted to make his objections to the adoption known to the court, he first had to obtain custody of the child. The European Court of Human Rights concluded that the biological father had ‘family life’ with the child on the basis of his relationship with the child’s mother,​[13]​ despite the fact that this relationship had broken down before the birth of the child. Subsequently, the court concluded that the biological father’s right to ‘family life’ had been violated because he had not been heard in the adoption procedure. From this case it can be concluded that a biological father with ‘family life’ may under certain circumstances have to be heard in the adoption procedure of his child. 
Since 1998 Dutch law distinguishes between two kinds of biological fathers: begetters and sperm donors. According to the Explanatory Memorandum belonging to the Revision of Affiliation Law and the Law of Adoption Act “The begetter of a child is the man who has caused the child to come into being together with the mother in a natural way. The term begetter is not equivalent to the term ‘biological father’. A donor is not a begetter, but he is the biological father of the child. It is not possible to file a request for the judicial establishment of paternity of a donor. [..] Nor is it possible to file a request for a maintenance assessment against a donor.”​[14]​ The distinction is solely based on whether or not the child has been conceived in a ‘natural’ way; the intention of the biological father is in principle of no importance for this issue. ​[15]​ 
However, since the introduction of the Adoption by Same-Sex Couples Act there appears to be a third category of biological fathers, namely the known donor with ‘family life’. This kind of biological father may play a part in the adoption procedure. But what exactly is the part he may play? The Explanatory Memorandum to the Act states: “In order to obtain clarity about the intentions of the known donor with regard to his parentage, it is appropriate that this donor may be summoned by the judge to be heard in the adoption proceedings. On the basis of his statement and other circumstances of the case, it will have to be ascertained whether the child really has nothing more to expect from this donor as a parent.”​[16]​
From this it can be deduced that the known donor with ‘family life’ may be summoned as if he were a parent within the meaning of section 1:227 (3). However, this does not mean that he is given the right to veto the adoption given to a parent pursuant to section 1:228 (1) under d. Nor does the fact that the donor does not object to the adoption mean that the adoption can take place. In the parliamentary debates (Kamerstukken) the following was said on this subject: “The mere fact that the original parent indicates that he has no interest in maintaining legal family ties with the child, is an important indication that the child has nothing to expect from him in that respect, but does not necessarily warrant that conclusion. Other facts and circumstances may force the judge to conclude that in reality that parent is, or will be, able to give (even more) substance to the legal family ties.”​[17]​ 
    
What happens in practice?
Will there be many problems in practice with the adoption by B? B can start adoption proceedings immediately after the birth of her partner’s child (Dutch Civil Code 1:228 (1) under f, last sentence). Since the European Court of Human Rights has determined that donorship in itself is not enough to create ‘family life’ with the child – for this there have to be additional circumstances​[18]​ - this leaves the known donor little or no time to build up ‘family life’ with the child.​[19]​ 
However, the argument that the present interpretation of the new requirement will hardly cause problems for lesbian co-mothers is no reason to allow the situation to continue. If the legislator wants the courts in adoption applications to check whether it is in the interest of the child and the biological father that their relationship is protected, it first has to make clear which of the three kinds of biological fathers it has in mind. Furthermore, rejecting an adoption request by a co-mother on the basis of this new requirement must have some legal consequences for the biological father. Otherwise the child would end up with only one legal parent where there are possibly two persons willing to become a second legal parent. If the court decides that the mother cannot adopt, while at the same time the law does not regard the donor with ‘family life’ as a begetter, the child (and the mother) is (are) left without any rights against either the donor or the co-mother to have their paternity/maternity established in court or to claim maintenance. This problem could, for instance, be solved, by leaving the shared parental authority with the co-mothers, and giving the biological father the right to recognize the child so that he can at least become the legal father of the child. 





3. The known donor and substitution of the mother’s consent to recognize the child

In the case described in the introduction, the donor was convinced that the mother would give him consent to recognize the child after its birth, because he claimed that they had agreed to this. However, when it became clear that the mother was not willing to do so, he requested the Utrecht District Court to substitute the mother’s consent.​[20]​ The Court concluded that the legislator had not taken into account the fact that a donor may have the intention to become a parent. Therefore, the court decided that, given the circumstances, the man must be treated as if he were a begetter, which gives him the right to file a request for the court to substitute the mother’s consent (para. 3.8). The Amsterdam Court of Appeal​[21]​ disagreed with the conclusions of the Utrecht District Court and dismissed the donor’s request. The court held that the legislator had taken into account the intention of a donor to become a parent, but had chosen to deny the donor the right of a begetter to request the court to substitute the mother’s consent (para. 4.7). 
The matter came before the Dutch Supreme Court, which gave its decision on the matter on 24 January 2003.​[22]​ It held that the fact that section 1:204 (3) - which gives a begetter the right to request the court to substitute the mother’s consent - does not apply to a donor “does not affect the validity of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Pursuant to this Article the biological father who has ‘family life’ with his child, regardless of the way the pregnancy has come about, has a right to have his ‘family life’ protected.” This means that a mother refusing consent to a donor with ‘family life’ to recognize his child, may be misusing her rights. “Assuming for the sake of argument that there is ‘family life’ between the man and the child, in the case at hand – the mother and her partner have shared parental authority over the child and take care of her together – the mother would only misuse her right to refuse consent if she in fact has an interest not deserving of any respect whatsoever in her refusal​[23]​.” Given the fact that the mother and her partner both aim to become legal parents of the child, the mother has an interest in her refusal deserving of respect according to the Supreme Court.​[24]​ This judgement confirms that a donor, regardless of his and the co-mothers intentions before the birth, has no rights whatsoever with regard to the child unless the legal mother is willing to grant him certain rights. 
This case is interesting for more than one reason. First, for the possible consequences if an adoption application by a co-mother is rejected on the basis that the child still has something to expect from the donor as its parent. In such a case, it might be argued that, pursuant to this judgement, the mother misuses her right to refuse consent to recognition if she continues to persist in her refusal to give consent to the donor with ‘family life’. This would imply that if the adoption cannot take place, the child might still have two legal parents, provided that the biological father is willing to recognize the child.
Secondly this case is interesting because it is clear that the intentions of the donor to become a parent are not relevant for the law. In the case of a donor from a sperm bank this is understandable, but not in the case of someone who has indicated beforehand to the co-mothers that he has the intention to become a parent. As the Utrecht District Court already implicitly indicated, the problem lies in the criterion which is used to distinguish between a donor and a begetter.
  

4. The interests of the parties involved

The child
It may be clear that a child benefits in many ways from having two legal parents or in any case one legal parent and a begetter.​[25]​ For instance, a begetter has maintenance obligations with regard to the child and the child has inheritance rights against a legal parent. A donor, however, has no obligations with regard to the child: he has no maintenance obligations, a court cannot establish his paternity, and a child cannot inherit from a donor by operation of law.
For a child conceived by means of donor insemination (a DI child) during a male/female marriage, the marriage father becomes the legal father by operation of law (1:199 under a and 1:200 (3)). Neither the father nor the mother can deny the marriage father’s paternity even though he is not the biological father (Dutch Civil Code 1:207). But for a DI child born in a female/female marriage, the co-mother does not automatically become a legal parent. In the first case the child acquires a second legal parent by operation of law on the basis of the fact that its mother’s spouse did consent to the artificial insemination, whereas the child in the second case does not acquire a second legal parent by operation of law, despite the fact that its mother’s spouse also consented to the donor insemination. The consequence of this discrepancy is that - should the co-mother refuse to adopt - the child only has one legal parent whereas the child conceived under similar circumstances in a male/female marriage has two legal parents. This distinction becomes even more poignant if the marriage between its mother and her female spouse is terminated before the child’s birth. Had its mother been married to a man, the child could have had the ex-spouse’s paternity established and the legal mother could have claimed maintenance on behalf of the child. The child conceived during a female/female marriage which was terminated before its birth, has no such rights against the ex-spouse of its mother.​[26]​ 
For a child born outside of wedlock the same differences exist. The male partner in life who has consented to the donor insemination treatment (DI treatment) of his female partner, can be subject to the judicial establishment of his paternity as well as a maintenance obligation with regard to the child (Dutch Civil Code 1:394 and 1:207). But a female partner in life (or the donor) who consents to the DI treatment of her female partner cannot become subject to either action. 
A number of these problems have been solved with the introduction of shared parental authority by operation of law as from the moment of the child’s birth within a lesbian marriage or registered partnership. Shared parental authority does not give the non-biological parent the status of a legal parent, but she/he is obliged to raise and care for the child.​[27]​ Furthermore, the partner has a maintenance obligation with regard to the child. On the other hand, shared parental authority does not create inheritance rights. Problems are most likely to occur when the marriage or partnership ends before the birth of the child, for in that case there will be no shared parental authority and therefore no maintenance obligation on the part of the ex-partner. Only a begetter or a male partner in life who has consented to an action that may have resulted in the conception of the child has a maintenance obligation without having parental authority.​[28]​ Moreover, it is still unclear whether the same strict criteria with regard to terminating shared parental authority that apply in case of the separation of two parents apply in the case of a separation of a parent and a person other than a parent. In the legal literature it is generally agreed that this will be the case (Wortman 2002:182). A recent judgement by the Dutch Supreme Court indicates that once shared parental authority of two parents has come into existence - whether by operation of law or upon application - it cannot be terminated solely at the request of one of the parents.​[29]​ This judgement centred on the application of section 1:253n concerning the termination of the shared parental authority of unmarried parents, which is also the basis for an application for the termination of shared parental authority by a parent and a person other than a parent. 

Donors and begetters
One of the problems with co-mother adoption and giving a co-mother the status of legal parent by operation of law is caused by the unworkable and unjust criterion that forms the basis for the distinction between a donor and a begetter: namely having begotten a child with the mother in a natural way. This means that if a man who has been living with his girlfriend for years, is forced to resort to artificial insemination with his own sperm to conceive a child with his girlfriend, he is not the begetter of his child. If the mother subsequently refuses to consent to his recognition of the child, he does not have the right under Dutch law to request the court to substitute the mother’s consent. Like the known donor in the case discussed above, his only option is to make use of the concept of misuse of the mother’s right to refuse consent (Vlaardingerbroek 2002:196). This also applies to the man who wants to have a child with his male partner with the help of a surrogate mother. The child is artificially conceived with his sperm and carried to term by the surrogate mother. The artificial aspect gives him the status of a donor, despite the fact that he and not the surrogate mother had the intention to become a parent. If the surrogate mother refuses to allow him to recognize the child, he has no right to request the court to substitute the mother’s consent. The difference between these two examples lies in the fact that the child does have some rights (maintenance and the establishment of paternity) with regard to the partner in life of his mother, who consented to an act that may have resulted in the conception of the child​[30]​, but has no rights with regard to the man who engaged the surrogate mother in order to become a father.
Would it not be more just towards the father and the child to base the distinction between a begetter and a donor on a different criterion? The following may be a useful one: a donor is a person who has donated his sperm to a sperm bank; this person clearly has no intention to become a father. As such he has neither rights nor duties with regard to the child. In all other cases the donor becomes a begetter, despite the fact that the child was not conceived in a natural manner. This means that a man who donates his sperm to a specific woman, is a begetter. 
	Such an interpretation of the terms ‘donor’ and ‘begetter’, regardless of the choices that are made with regard to co-motherhood, may be introduced to give more weight to the intentions of the biological father/begetter. The unmarried father and the intended father in the surrogacy case mentioned earlier, who both have the intention to become a parent, will thus have more rights and duties with regard to the child that was conceived with their sperm. Another major advantage is the fact that the child will have more insight into its biological parentage. With regard to a begetter it can apply for a judicial establishment of paternity (Dutch Civil Code 1:207) and a donor at a sperm bank is subject to the new Act on donor data, which will lift the anonymity of sperm donors. The unclear status of a known donor who has not donated through the sperm bank and at the same time cannot be treated as the child’s begetter, will then come to an end.

Legal parenthood for lesbian co-mothers by operation of law?
During the parliamentary debates on the Adoption by Same-Sex Couples Bill, there was discussion as to whether lesbian co-mothers should acquire legal parenthood by operation of law. However, the legislator decided not to introduce a law to that effect, because that would mean relinquishing the central principle of Dutch affiliation law, namely that a child always has a mother and may have a father.​[31]​ That a child always has a mother is clear, but as has been shown, the possibility of having a father is reserved for children who have a begetter or a person who may be treated as if he/she were a begetter.​[32]​
Henstra (2002) proposed to give a co-mother the same rights and duties with regard to the child as a marriage father or a begetter. This means that a married co-mother will become a legal parent by operation of law of the child born into her marriage with the biological mother. A registered or cohabiting co-mother would be able to recognize the child with the mother’s consent.​[33]​ Furthermore, it would become possible for the court to establish the ‘maternity’ of the female partner in life who has consented to an act that may have resulted in the conception of the child by her female partner (Dutch Civil Code 1:207). Pursuant to section 1:394 this partner in life would be obliged to maintain the child as if she were a legal parent (Henstra 2002:181). An advantage of introducing these changes in Dutch family law would be the fact that almost from the very beginning there would be certainty about the legal position of the child.
On the other hand, this proposal is largely based on the idea that the donor only indirectly causes the coming into being of the child. “The donor does indeed provide the genetic material with the idea that it will be used to beget a child, but it is the mother and possibly her partner who prior to the actual conception of the child decide to proceed. This makes the biological father (donor) no longer directly responsible for the coming into being of the child, which means that something changes in the attribution of parental responsibility” (Henstra 2002:114). This may be so for the donor who donates to the sperm bank but is not necessarily true for the known donor. The case discussed in the introduction illustrates that all three parties may have the intention to become a parent and on that ground decide to have a child together. In cases like this it is less easy to defend giving a married lesbian co-mother the status of a legal parent by operation of law. Would it not be more just to involve all three parties in the upbringing of the child? At present this may happen by giving the mothers shared parental authority and the biological father the right to recognize the child. Because the two women already have shared parental authority over the child, the legal father cannot acquire parental authority. He can, however, ask the court to determine an access arrangement, as long as this is not detrimental to the mental and physical development of the child (Dutch Civil Code 1:377a (2)). Furthermore, the status of a legal parent gives him the certainty that, in case anything happens to one of the two women, he has some influence on what will happen to the child. 

7. Conclusion: one, two or three parents?

All the proposals/regulations discussed have their drawbacks, not in the least because the interests of the child and the intentions and interests of the biological and social parents are not always the same. The disadvantage of adoption is that the child is dependent on the willingness of the second mother to adopt. If the relationship is terminated before the birth, the child has no rights with regard to the second mother, whereas a DI child born into the relationship of a man and a woman would under similar circumstances have rights with regard to the man. On the other hand, the advantage of adoption is that there is a limited possibility to take into account the intentions and interests of the biological father. Moreover, adoption seems to offer a good prospect to safeguard the child’s right to know its origin.
Parenthood by operation of law for lesbian co-mothers will give the child certainty about its legal position, but leaves no room whatsoever for the intentions of the biological father. Unless he manages to build up ‘family life’ with the child within the meaning of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, he does not even have a right to contact with the child.​[34]​ One of the arguments used in favour of parenthood for lesbian co-mothers by operation of law within marriage is that it is contrary to the constitutional principle of equal treatment that a married man who makes use of donor sperm to conceive a child with his wife becomes a legal parent by operation of law, whereas this is not the case for a married lesbian co-mother, while neither of them are biological parents (Van Vliet 2000:44). This is a convincing argument, but in situations concerning the best interests of children the right to equal treatment of adults may not in itself be decisive. As is shown by the following quotation, the aim of all parental rights is to give parents the possibility to care for their children. They are not an end in themselves: “This brings us to the main modern justification for the rights of parenthood; that they exist in order, and only so far, that children can be protected and nurtured until they reach independence and adulthood” (Barton 1995:23).
An advantage of the proposal to replace adoption with a kind of shared parental authority with inheritance rights against the co-mother is that it leaves some room for the biological parent. For example, he may recognize the child after the birth, which leaves the shared parental authority with the mothers. On the other hand, shared parental authority can be terminated when the marriage or registered partnership is dissolved. As was indicated earlier, it is not yet clear which criteria will be used for giving one of the partners sole parental authority. What happens to the inheritance obligations when shared parental authority is terminated? If such obligations only exist while parental authority is shared between the two partners, with possibly - as is the case for maintenance obligations - an additional term after the ending of the shared parental authority, the child does not have the desired certainty. With regard to the maintenance obligation after the dissolution of the relationship, it seems at the very least fair to make section 1:394 - which imposes a maintenance obligation on the mother’s male partner in life who consented to an act that may have resulted in the conception of the child - also applicable to a female partner in life who consented to a similar act.
It is not easy to make a conscious choice between shared parental authority with inheritance rights for the child, co-mother adoption or legal parenthood for a co-mother through recognition or by operation of law. One of the complicating factors is that a child growing up in a relationship between two men is also entitled to protection of his/her family situation. This protection is much more difficult to realise in contemporary Dutch affiliation law, because the mother who gives birth to a child is its legal parent. Making the male partner of a father a legal parent by operation of law is not an option, because it would involve the severing of legal family ties by operation of law. In such cases the only option is adoption or another form of transfer of legal parenthood.
	According to Dutch affiliation law a child is entitled to at least one legal parent, namely a mother. However, from a number of regulations, such as the presumption of paternity within marriage, the possibility for a man to recognize a child that is not genetically related to him, it can be deduced that the preferred situation is one where a child has two legal parents. But could a child also have three parents? Depending on the meaning one wishes to assign to the concept ‘parent’, a child born into the registered partnership or marriage of two women and recognized by its biological father after its birth, has three parents: two with parental authority and two with the status of legal parents. 
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^18	  Dutch Supreme Court 16 January 1990, NJ 1990/630, ECHR, M. against the Netherlands, appl. no. 16944/90.
^19	  The situation for children born before the introduction of the Adoption by same-sex couples Act, may be entirely different. If the biological father has had a considerable share in the care for the child, there can of course be ‘family life’ between father and child that deserves protection.
^20	  District Court of Utrecht 14 March 2001, case no. 122753.
^21	  Court of Appeal of Amsterdam 22 November 2001, rekestnummer 370/2001.
^22	  Dutch Supreme Court 24 January 2003, JOL 2003, 51.
^23	  Dutch Supreme Court 18 May 1990, nr. 7546, NJ 1991, 374.
^24	  It would be interesting to see whether this donor, who may not recognize his child, will be heard in the adoption procedure of his child.
^25	  It has been proposed to make it possible for a child to have three parents if all the parties concerned agree to this: the two mothers and the biological father. See Hondt (2002:218).
^26	  As mentioned earlier the child has no rights with regard to the donor, except for a right to know its origin if it concerns a donor form a sperm bank.
^27	  1:247 and 1:253w.
^28	  Dutch Supreme Court 10 August 2001, Rechtspraak van de Week 2001/140.
^29	  Dutch Supreme Court 28 March 2003, AF2688, R02/060HR.
^30	  1:207 and 1:394.
^31	  Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 673 nr.5, p.20.
^32	  1:200 (3) and 1:394. 
^33	   The suggestions made by Henstra leave the existing structure of Dutch affiliation law intact, hence the method of becoming a legal mother is dependent on the status of the relationship between the legal (birth) mother and her partner.
^34	  See for instance M v. the Netherlands (16944/90) decided by the European Commission on Human rights on 8 February 1993. This case concerned a sperm donor who had regular contact with the child for a couple of months. Contact was broken off by the mother and her partner (the child’s co-guardian) after 8 months. The donor requested the Juvenile Court to determine an arrangement concerning his access to the child. The case ended up before the European Court of Human Rights, which determined that biological fatherhood in itself does not constitute family life; additional circumstances are necessary for family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  It is necessary to establish that there is family life worthy of protection before a Dutch court can determine an access arrangement between a biological father and a child. 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